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COMMENTS
Article 2298, the Codification of the Principle Forbidding
Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit
as a Basis for Recovery in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment presents the new version of Louisiana Civil Code article
22981 to the reader. The new Article 2298 appears in the recent revision to the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on quasi-contracts, which became effective January
1, 1996.2 Article 2298 incorporates the existing Louisiana jurisprudence
concerning unjust enrichment, and replaces quantum meruit as a basis for
recovery in quasi-contractual settings. Since Louisiana courts have previously
used quantum meruit in most cases for which no specific statutory basis of
recovery can be found, this comment should interest those members of the bench
and bar whose cases commonly involve construction contracts, commercial
contracts, voided or annulled contracts, contracts for services, and the like.
Quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are the kudzu in the garden of
Louisiana jurisprudence. They appear everywhere, entangle all in their path, and
are seemingly unmanageable. Few subjects in any jurisdiction have led to as
much confusion as quasi-contracts in Louisiana. The cases provide frequent
examples of haphazard analysis. Furthermore, courts have often used weak
precedents to resolve disputes while ignoring available techniques of codal
analysis.'
Copyright 1996, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Article 2298 provides:
Art. 2298. Enrichment without cause; compensation
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is
bound to compensate that person. The term "without cause" is used in this context to
exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law. The
remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another
remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to which one has been
enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the time the suit is
brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered.
1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1. See infra text accompanying notes 125-184 for a complete discussion
of Article 2298.
2. 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 5. Article 2298 was introduced in the Louisiana Legislature as
House Bill 713 on March 27, 1995. 1995 La. House J. 100. After legislative approval, Governor
Edwards signed House Bill 713 into law as 1995 Louisiana Acts 1041 on June 29, 1995.
3. See, e.g., College Assocs. v. City of Baton Rouge, 369 So. 2d 1066 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979); Porter v. Johnson, 408 So. 2d 961 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); North Dev. Co. v. McClure, 276
So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
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One frequently ignored analytical technique is the quasi-contractual remedy
known as the actio de in rem verso The actio de in rem verso provides
general guidelines for courts wishing to invoke the principle forbidding unjust
enrichment.' The principle forbidding unjust enrichment provides a theoretical
basis for the law of quasi-contracts." Quasi-contracts are legal obligations that
fall on a spectrum between contracts and delicts. Quasi-contracts differ from
contracts in that they are created without agreement among the parties.'
Likewise, quasi-contracts differ from delicts and quasi-delicts in that quasi-
contractual obligations may arise even though neither party is legally at fault.'
A court's creation of a quasi-contractual obligation may be justified by policy or
by notions of equity triggered by the act of one of the parties.'
The actio de in rem verso has been ignored in Louisiana, while the more
widely known common-law remedy, quantum meruit, has appeared in its
place." The existence of a Louisiana concept called quantum meruit, distinct
from the common law version, has increased the confusion apparent in some
applications of quasi-contractual remedies." The distinctions among the three
remedies appear below.
At common law, courts use quantum meruit12 to compensate a person for
services rendered in the absence of a contract.' 3 To that extent, quantum meruit
4. Actio de in rem verso is a Latin expression which signifies an action concerning property
used for the defendant's benefit. Ballentine's Law Dictionary 634 (3d ed. 1969).
5. The standard usage is "the principle (or theory) of unjust enrichment," rather than "the
principle (or theory)forbidding unjust enrichment." Nevertheless, the above usage will be employed
throughout this comment. The standard usage is ambiguous. The principle is not a mere elaboration
upon the definition of unjust enrichment. It encompasses the definition, the proposition that an
enrichment of this type is undesirable, and the remedy used to prevent such enrichment. Some have
argued that the word "unjust" provides the proper connotation, since an equitable principle will
naturally be opposed to anything unjust. While this argument may have some utilitarian merit, the
development of law will be hindered if the use of imprecise language is condoned.
6. See. e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Remedies 224 (1973); Alain A. Levasseur, Louisiana Law of
Unjust Enrichment in Quasi-Contracts 13 (1991).
7. La. Civ. Code arts. 2292-2294 (1870).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2293 (1870).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 2292 (1870).
10. See, e.g., S. Mercantile Group, Inc. v. Gulf S. Catalyst Servs., Inc., 471 So. 2d 728 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1985); Clarke v. Shaffett, 37 So. 2d 56 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1948); Pasquier, Batson, &
Co. v. Ewing, 430 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
11. See, e.g., Morphy, Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569 (La.
1989); Louisiana State Mineral Bd. v. Albarado, 180 So. 2d 700 (La. 1965); Houma Armature Works
& Supply, Inc. v. Landry, 417 So. 2d 42 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1982); Clarke v. Shaffett, 37 So. 2d 56
(La. App. Ist Cir. 1948); Swifiships, Inc. v. Burdin, 338 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
Custom Builders & Supply v. Revels, 310 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
12. In this comment, use of the words "common law quantum meruit" or simply "quantum
meruit" without modification will signify the common law version of quantum meruit. The words
"the Louisiana version of quantum meruit" signify the Louisiana version.
13. Dobbs, supra note 6, at 237. "Quantum meruit" is Latin for "as much as deserved."
Black's Law Dictionary 1243 (6th ed. 1990).
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resembles the actio de in rem verso. Unfortunately, quantum meruit lacks
readily ascertainable rules for the determination of the proper amount of
compensation. The technique used to determine recovery varies according to the
circumstances of each case.'
4
In Louisiana, courts employ a distinct remedy also called quantum meruit,
but only if a contract does exist. Courts use the Louisiana version of quantum
meruit to supply a missing price in an otherwise valid contract. If the parties
contest the price to be paid under a contract for goods or services, a court may
use the Louisiana version of quantum meruit to supply the missing price, thus
completing the contract.' 5 According to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the
equitable principles upon which the Louisiana doctrine is based appear in
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1903 and 1967.16 The price determined by this
method usually equals the fair market value for the good or service that was the
object of the contract.
The actio de in rem verso has a purpose and scope somewhat broader than
those of common law quantum meruit. While quantum meruit serves only to
compensate for services rendered in the absence of a binding contract,1" the
actio de in rem verso corrects all forms of unjust enrichment. The actio de in
rem verso is analogous to a common law action for restitution. Quantum meruit,
on the other hand, is a specific example of an action based upon principles of
restitution.18 The actio de in rem verso also provides a specific method for
determining proper compensation. The new Article 2298 incorporates the actio
de in rem verso, and eliminates the need for quantum meruit as a basis for
recovery in Louisiana.19
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning in 1967, issued
guidelines to govern quasi-contractual settings.2' These judicial guidelines did
14. Suzanne A. Burke, Quantum Meruit in Louisiana, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 631, 636-37 (1976).
15. Morphy, Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 574 (La. 1989).
16. Id. at 574.
17. Quantum meruit is technically only one remedy among the many available in an action for
restitution. However, modem courts use the terms "restitution," "unjust enrichment," and "quantum
meruit" almost interchangeably. See infra note 18.
18. The word "restitution" is, in most American jurisdictions, used to convey the same idea that
"unjust enrichment" conveys in Louisiana. In other words, if a party is found to owe restitution, it
is because he has been unjustly enriched. For a general discussion of the confused state of the law
of restitution, see Dobbs, supra note 6, at 224-25. Since 1980 Louisiana courts have used the word
"restitution" almost exclusively to refer to the compensation a convicted criminal or juvenile
delinquent must pay to his victim. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 615 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1993); State v.
Hardy, 432 So. 2d 865 (La. 1983); State v. Freeman, 577 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); State
v. Bryan, 535 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); State v. J.B., 643 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1994); State v. Johnson, 479 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); State v. Schmidt, 558 So. 2d 255
(La. App. 5th Ci. 1990). But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. M & A Farms, Ltd., 462 So. 2d 1323
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Garner v. Hoffman, 638 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
19. 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1.
20. The first modem Louisiana case to attempt a rational and reasoned distinction among the
actio de in rem verso and the two forms of quantum meruit was Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251
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not receive the acceptance that might have been expected. Undoubtedly the fact
that courts still commonly use quantum meruit as a basis for recovery, even
though it has been in disfavor for years,"1 provided some impetus for the
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code. One can not speculate whether the revision
of the Civil Code articles concerning quasi-contracts will provide a suitable
framework for the systematic application of quasi-contractual remedies in
Louisiana. However, this revision presents the best opportunity the Louisiana
legal community has ever have to bring order to the field of quasi-contractual
obligations.
Part II of this comment traces the development of prior law, focusing on the
development of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit from their roots to the
present day. Part III presents the new article 2298 in detail, examines its impact
on prior law, and offers a brief conclusion.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Roman Era
The notion of a quasi-contract dates from Roman times.' Roman law
recognized quasi-contractual obligations as early as 100 A.D. The major
distinction among legal obligations of private persons before that time was the
one between contractual obligations, which were created by mutual agreement,
and delictual obligations, which resulted from the wrongful act of one of the
parties." By the end of the fifth century, legal theorists clearly distinguished
between contractual obligations and obligations resulting from a lawful non-
consensual action. In the sixth century A.D., with the publication of the corpus
juris civilis, the Emperor Justinian created the category of obligations known as
obligationibus quasi ex contractu, thus formally classifying quasi-contracts.'
La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967). The actio de in rem verso was further developed in Morphy,
Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569 (La. 1989); Creely v. Leisure Living,
Inc., 437 So. 2d 816 (La. 1983); Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974);
and Brignac v. Boisdore, 288 So. 2d 31 (La. 1973).
21. See, e.g., Oil Purchasers, Inc. v. Kuehling, 334 So. 2d 420, 425 (La. 1976); Fogleman v.
Cajun Bag & Supply, Co., 638 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
22. Robert W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law 371-75 (1956); Richard W. Leage, Roman
Private Law 382-86 (1961). See generally Levasseur, supra note 6, at 333-437. Professor
Levasseur's treatise contains the best available discussion of the historical development of quasi-
contracts in Louisiana.
23. Leage, supra note 22, at 310-11.
24. Professor Levasseur is fond of saying "Note the placement of the ex." This admonition
refers to the Latin expression obligationibus quasi ex contractu. A translation of the expression into
English yields "obligations that seem as if they arose from a contract." This placement of the ex is
crucial because it provides a different conceptual understanding of quasi-contracts than would be
provided by the expression obligationibus ex quasi contractu. Such an expression would mean
"obligations arising from something similar to a contract." The first expression emphasizes that the
obligations are similar to contractual obligations in their effects on the parties, even though they arise
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Although the term originally served as a label for a variety of unrelated legally
imposed obligations, it evolved into a separate theoretical basis for an obligation,
equivalent to contract, delict, and quasi-delict.'
In the Roman Empire, a slave owner could benefit from the financial
arrangements made by his slave, since he could lawfully appropriate a slave's
property at will. Before 100 A.D. courts did not hold the owner responsible for
the slave's failings, shortcomings, or breaches of contract unless the owner had
also joined with the slave in the slave's contract. To take advantage of this
situation, property owners would give title to certain property to a slave and
require him to transact business, form contracts, or hire out as a laborer. Assets
transferred from slave owner to slave were called peculium.26 By means of
such a transfer the slave owner could avoid legal responsibility for the peculium
while still deriving economic benefit therefrom.
27
The inequity of this situation, from which wealthy property owners could
derive financial gain without liability for any wrongdoing, led Roman courts to
recognize an action against an owner for the behavior of his slave under a
doctrinal theory similar to agency. This action was called the actio de peculio,
or action concerning peculium. The actio de peculio provided aggrieved parties
with recourse against the owner, but limited his liability to the amount of the
peculium.25 Procedural developments led to the innovation of the actio de
peculio et de in rem verso.29 This new action allowed a third party to bring a
direct action against the owner to the extent that he had derived any economic
benefit from the slave's transaction, even if his benefit exceeded the amount of
the peculium.3"
The actio de peculio et de in rem verso was the forerunner of the modem
actio de in rem verso, or action to prevent unjust enrichment.31 It led to the
codification of the principle forbidding unjust enrichment in the last book of
Justinian's Digest.
3 2
from a setting that has no resemblance at all to a contract. The second expression erroneously gives
rise to the idea that there must be an "implied contract." A "contract implied in fact" is a perfectly
good contract, and creates contractual obligations rather than quasi-contractual ones. A "contract
implied at law," which is suggested by the erroneous expression ex quasi contractu, is a legal fiction
that symbolizes a court's attempt to recognize that the obligation it is imposing is similar to a
contractual obligation. The expression "contract implied at law" has the unfortunate consequence of
focusing attention on a non-existent contract, and away from the factual circumstances that led the
court to impose the obligation. A quasi-contractual obligation has the same effect as a contractual
obligation, but its origin has nothing in common with that of contractual obligations. Thus, "Note
the placement of the ex." (Translation by J. Oakes).
25. Leage, supra note 22, at 313.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Lee, supra note 22, at 359.
28. Leage, supra note 22, at 374.
29. Id.; Lee, supra note 22, at 359; Levasseur, supra note 6, at 335.
30. Lee, supra note 22, at 359-60.
31. See supra note 4.
32. "Iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuriafieri locupletiorem."
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B. The French Era
The law of France forms a link between the laws of the Roman Empire and
the laws of Louisiana. French law exemplifies the Roman legal heritage. In
turn, early Louisiana law draws heavily upon the French law of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. The Napoleonic Code provided inspiration to the
drafters of the original Louisiana Civil Code.3 Therefore, a proper understand-
ing of quasi-contracts in Louisiana's legal history requires a survey of the French
treatment of the subject.
Pothier's Civil Law treatise provided the primary inspiration for the French
Civil Code chapters on obligations.34 Pothier asserted that the quasi-contractual
obligation naturally derived from equitable principles. In the late nineteenth
century, some French legal realists suggested that legislators artificially created
quasi-contractual obligations, that the subject had no theoretical significance, and
that the distinction between quasi-contractual and contractual obligations should
be abandoned. 5 Other French scholars disagreed, arguing that the quasi-
contractual obligation arises from a set of factual circumstances. For these
scholars, legislation did not create quasi-contractual obligations. Instead,
legislation signified the lawmaker's acknowledgment of the factual circumstances
which created the quasi-contractual obligation.36 According to Planiol, the basic
legal principle that no person should be allowed to enrich himself at the expense
of another justifies the enforcement of quasi-contractual obligations.37 Modem
French law has followed the path of Pothier and Planiol. Today, the modem
formulation of French quasi-contractual theory envisions the equitable principle
forbidding unjust enrichment as the ultimate source of all quasi-contractual
doctrine.38
Surprisingly, French doctrinal writers of the early nineteenth century
overlooked the principle forbidding unjust enrichment. Although the French
developed a limited treatment of quasi-contracts, 9 they never undertook a
comprehensive study of the field. Pothier wrote extensively on two specific
examples of quasi-contracts: payment of a thing not due (actio indebiti), and
management of another's affairs (negotiorum gestio)." However, he never
developed a systematic treatment of the principles that gave rise to quasi-
("By the law of nature it is fair that no one become richer by the loss and injury of another."). Dig.
50.17.206 (Pomponius, Various Readings 9).
33. This paper expresses no opinion concerning whether Louisiana law descends primarily from
French or Spanish law. It suffices to recognize that French law influenced the drafters of the original
Louisiana codes, and that those drafters knew of French legal developments.
34. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 12.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Fr. C. Civ., arts. 1370-71.
40. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 339.
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contracts. In general, the French approach to quasi-contractual obligations was
uncharacteristically practical, rather than theoretical. The lack of doctrinal
development, particularly in the works of Pothier, resulted in the absence of
provisions dealing with unjust enrichment in the French Civil Code until the late
nineteenth century.41 This gap in the French law led to the adoption of the
common law version of quantum meruit as a basis for recovery in Louisiana.
C. The Historical Development of Quantum Meruit
At early common law, substantive innovations were dependent upon
procedural developments. Procedural developments took the form of new writs
of action. As human interaction intensified, new writs were developed.' One
of the earliest writs was the writ of trespass, applicable in cases involving
forcible interference with a person's rights."' The writ of trespass led to
"trespass on the case," or simply "case." In the fourteenth century a plaintiff
who had been the victim of professional malpractice relied upon a writ of
case." Case was applicable when the defendant had undertaken to do some-
thing and failed, and the plaintiff had suffered harm as a result. The plaintiff
had to allege an undertaking by the defendant to make case an available
action.4 s The Latin word used to represent undertaking was assumpsit."
Eventually assumpsit developed into a separate writ distinct from case.47
Assumpsit became an extremely versatile writ, used in a variety of situations.
For example, litigants commonly used the writ of assumpsit in an action to
recover the payment of a thing not due."'
In addition to the action to recover the payment of a thing not due, the writ
of assumpsit served to bring actions to enforce actual contracts in which a price
was not agreed upon (analogous to the Louisiana version of quantum meruit), to
compensate for performance of services rendered in the absence of a contract
(quantum meruit), and to compensate for delivery of goods in the absence of a
contract (quantum valebant).49 Courts generally measured recovery in these
situations by the fair market value of the goods or services."
Assumpsit came to North America with the ubiquitous Blackstone. A
change in emphasis may have led to a change in terminology. While the most
41. Id. at 339, 341-42.
42. For a survey of the history of the development of new forms of action at common law, see
generally F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1962); Ralph Sutton, Personal
Actions at Common Law (1929).
43. Sutton, supra note 42, at 57.
44. Dobbs, supra note 6, at 233.
45. Id.
46. Maitland, supra note 42, at 68.
47. Id. at 69.
48. Dobbs, supra note 6, at 236.
49. Id. at 236-38.
50. Id. at 237.
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common claim under the writ of assumpsit in Britain was for payment of a thing
not due, in the early years of our nation currency and negotiable instruments
were not readily available in all areas. Labor, however, was cheap and plentiful.
Therefore, the most common form of quasi-contractual action brought through
assumpsit was most likely a quantum meruit action to recover for services
rendered. In time, quantum meruit became synonymous with all forms of
restitution in the United States, and the terms "assumpsit" and "quantum
valebant" fell into disuse.
D. Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment in Louisiana Law
As explained earlier, no provisions of the early French Civil Code dealt
explicitly with unjust enrichment. Doctrinal writers focused on a practical
application of the principle forbidding unjust enrichment to certain factual
circumstances, rather than on theoretical development. Since the Louisiana Civil
Code was based on the French model, it is not surprising that early Louisiana
legal scholars overlooked the principle forbidding unjust enrichment. However,
problems involving unjust enrichment arise in almost every walk of life and
Louisiana courts had to adopt some legal principle to deal with these problems.
They naturally chose quantum meruit; it was the only general quasi-contractual
remedy available to them.
In 1820, quantum meruit indirectly appeared in the Louisiana jurisprudence
in the case of Gilly v. Henry,5 which involved a sale of flour. The plaintiff
delivered to the defendant one hundred barrels of flour. No price was set but the
defendant accepted it anyway. Later the plaintiff attempted to collect, quoting
a market price of thirteen dollars per barrel. The defendant initially asked for
more time to pay, then refused to pay at all. The plaintiff sued. The Gilly court
cited no statutory or codal authority; it resolved the issue by referring to the
common law principle of quantum valebant. 2 Quantum valebant is closely
related to quantum meruit. Quantum meruit generally involves a personal action
for services rendered. 3 However, quantum valebant is restricted to recovery
for the value of goods when the putative buyer is unable or unwilling to return
them and the parties have not agreed upon a price. 4 The Gilly court's usage
of the principle of quantum valebant indicated to contemporary attorneys that
quantum meruit was acceptable.
Five years after Gilly, in Morgan v. Mitchell,55 a Louisiana court explicitly
recognized quantum meruit. Necessity had forced Louisiana courts to import a
remedy to deal with a commonly arising situation that the Louisiana legislature
51. Gilly v. Henry, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 402 (La. 1820).
52. Id. at 418. Quantum valebant is Latin for "as much as they were worth." Black's Law
Dictionary 1244 (6th ed. 1990).
53. Dobbs, supra note 6, at 237.
54. Id. at 238.
55. 3 Mart. (n.s.) 576 (La. 1825).
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had not addressed. If the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 had contained an express
provision concerning unjust enrichment, perhaps quantum meruit would never
have appeared in Louisiana.
Quantum meruit was almost the exclusive remedy in Louisiana for quasi-
contractual disputes until 1967. In fact, between 1820 and 1967 only two
Louisiana Supreme Court cases resolved quasi-contractual disputes by referring
to civilian doctrine: Payne & Harrison v. Scott56 and Garland v. Estate of
Scott.
7
In Payne, a merchant sought to recover the value of goods and merchandise
that the defendant and his minor children had used. The Louisiana Supreme
Court first found that no contract had been established." The court then turned
to the plaintiff's possible remedies in the absence of an enforceable contract: "If
the plaintiffs can recover at all, it is in the form of the action known in the civil
law as de in rem verso." 9 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not
recover at all.' However, the decision served to establish the civilian actio de
in rem verso in the Louisiana jurisprudence." The decision also created two
limitations: the actio de in rem verso was available only in cases where no
contract had been formed, and recovery was limited to the benefit actually
conferred upon the defendant.62
The second case, Garland v. Estate of Scott, involved a dispute over the
validity and extent of a power of attorney. The defendants argued that because
the power of attorney was invalid, the actions of the deceased's purported agent
did not bind the estate. The supreme court reinforced its holding from Payne
and stated that even if the power of attorney were invalid, the court would hold
the estate liable to the extent that it had gained from the agent's actions.63 The
procedural mechanism the court used to support the plaintiff's claim was the
actio de in rem verso. The court cited the Digest of Justinian for the principle
that no man should be enriched by the loss or injury incurred by another."
Although one might expect the Louisiana Supreme Court to further develop
this abbreviated line of cases, there is no additional treatment of the actio de in
rem verso in the Louisiana jurisprudence until 1967.65 In the interim, although
56. 14 La. Ann. 760 (1859).
57. 15 La. Ann. 143 (1860).
58. Payne, 14 La. Ann. at 761.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Since one of the fundamental principles of civilian methodology is the idea that legislation
is the primary source of law, it is ironic that a court, rather than the legislature, would introduce this
civilian concept into Louisiana. Here we see a court acting in opposition to civilian principles,
motivated in part by a desire to preserve Louisiana's civilian heritage. The development of the law
in any mixed jurisdiction is undoubtedly filled with such contradictions.
62. Payne, 14 La. Ann. at 761.
63. Garland, 15 La. Ann. at 144.
64. Id.
65. See Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).
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courts referred occasionally to "unjust enrichment," they invariably used quantum
meruit to resolve the disputes before them."
While quantum meruit can be used as a quasi-contractual remedy, it does not
provide a neutral, generally applicable method of determining the appropriate
amount of compensation in a given case. A survey of the jurisprudence reveals
inconsistencies. In fact, one commentator has written:
The decisions have variously explained quantum meruit as one of the
quasi contracts described in Civil Code articles 2292-95, as an
outgrowth of the moral maxim incorporated in article 1965, or as an
admitted common law solution to an inequitable set of circumstances.
Under the one heading of quantum meruit, the courts have measured
recovery sometimes by the market value of the goods and services
including a reasonable profit, sometimes by the amount of the plaintiff's
impoverishment including profit, sometimes by the plaintiff's impover-
ishment excluding profit, and sometimes by the amount of benefit
retained by the defendant.
Despite the differing measures of recovery, however, no compre-
hensive explanation of the divergent awards appears in the jurispru-
dence.67
Close study of the case law suggests that courts have tended to rely on
precedents with similar factual circumstances, without giving consideration to the
need for a consistent application of rational legal principles." Consequently,
courts have used quantum meruit to give widely diverging and sometimes
irreconcilable awards. Some examples follow.
While courts routinely grant quantum meruit recovery to attorneys for
services rendered in the absence of a binding contract, the same courts deny
quantum meruit recovery to real estate brokers and agents who are determined
66. See Clarke v. Shaffett, 37 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948). There the court explains that
the plaintiff has stressed the defendant's "unjust enrichment," and resolves the case by finding that
recovery under quantum meruit would be inappropriate.
67. Burke, supra note 14, at 636-37 (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978); Hebert v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); Mitchell v. Turner, 588 So. 2d 1305 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991); Fowler v. Jordan, 430 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Gaspard,
664 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995); Miguez and Leckband v. Holston's Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
614 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Henry R. Liles, APLC v. Bourgeois, 517 So. 2d 1078 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1987); Brennan v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 635 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994); Keys
v. Mercy Hosp., 537 So. 2d 1223 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989); Oppenheim v. Bouterie, 505 So. 2d 100
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Garden Hill Land Corp. v. Cambre, 354 So. 2d 1064 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 356 So. 2d 439 (1978); Fiasconaro & Fiasconaro v. Orlando, 342 So. 2d 1261 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1977); Bertucci v. Mclntire, 648 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Gordon v. Levet, 643
So. 2d 371 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 648 So. 2d 394 (1994); Boutall v. Vickers, 532 So. 2d
928 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
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to have acted without a binding contract.70 In cases involving services rendered
or work done, where the courts have found no valid contract, they have measured
quantum meruit recovery in the following ways: the percentage of the contract
price that equals the percentage of work completed; 71 the cost of materials,
labor, and equipment rental incurred by the contractor, increased by a reasonable
profit;72 the cost of materials and labor incurred by the contractor, increased by
a reasonable profit; 7" the cost of materials and labor incurred by the contractor,
without profit; 4 the lesser of the contractor's impoverishment and the owner's
benefit;75 the appropriate compensation as determined by expert testimony; 6
the contract price less damages caused by the breach;77 the price of the same
services in previous transactions between the parties; 7 the invoice price; the
market value for services rendered;80 and a "fair" award for services ren-
dered."' In cases involving real property, courts generally measure recovery by
determining the rental value of the property. 2 However, at least one court
70. See, e.g., Brown v. Williams, 587 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Woods Realty, Inc.
v. Brimberry Trust, 521 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Century 21 Flavin Realty, Inc. v. Erwin
Heirs, Inc., 657 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 454 (1995); Prado v. Golemi,
540 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
71. See, e.g., Big Gravel Co. v. Gremillion, 422 So. 2d 1179 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ
denied, 429 So. 2d 130 (1983); Drilled Crossings, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 663 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 664 So. 2d 443 (1995).
72. See, e.g., Coastal Timbers, Inc. v. Regard, 483 So. 2d 1110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
73. See, e.g., Villars v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 415 So. 2d
945 (1982); Blackie's Rental Tool & Supply Co. v. J.P. Vanway, 563 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1990); Kinchen v. Gilworth, 454 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 458 So. 2d 478
(1984).
74. See, e.g., Merrydale Glass Works, Inc. v. Merriam, 349 So. 2d 1315 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 350 So. 2d 1211 (1977); Harper v. J.B. Wells Estate, 575 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1991); Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So. 2d 1366 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 606 So. 2d 540 (1992);
Hagberg v. John Bailey Contractor, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Alonzo v. Chifici,
541 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (wherein the court states that Louisiana courts have
erroneously labeled the applicable equitable principles "quantum meruit," and then proceeds by using
quantum meruit techniques).
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Hudson, 519 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Smith v. McMichael,
381 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Branldine v. Capuano, 656 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1995).
76. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Delcambre Tel. Co., 546 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989).
77. See, e.g., Keating v. Miller, 339 So. 2d 955 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So.
2d 904 (1977).
78. See, e.g., Laga v. Village of Loreauville, 571 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
79. See, e.g., Bar-Tow, Inc. v. Roy's Transp., Inc., 616 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
80. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Opt, Inc., 421 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427
So. 2d 438 (1983).
81. See, e.g., Sims-Smith, Ltd. v. Stokes 466 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
82. See, e.g., Theriot v. P & R Farms, Inc., 527 So. 2d 3 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 528
So. 2d 154 (1988); Dixie Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Bonura, 549 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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measured recovery by referring to the loss in the appraised value of the
plaintiff's land caused by the defendant's conduct.s3
Given the factual circumstances of each case, each of the above remedies
was undoubtedly equitable. The wide range of possibilities, however, provides
little guidance to attorneys preparing for a case or to courts seeking to apply an
established rule. In Fullerton v. Scarecrow Club, Inc., 4 the plaintiff sought
recovery through quantum meruit. The court stated:
The jurisprudence has adopted several different approaches for
determining quantum meruit awards.... Perhaps the most astute basis
for determining quantum meruit was articulated in Jones v. City of Lake
Charles, wherein the court acknowledged that there is no mathematical
formula for computing quantum meruit awards: "The general rule is
that the plaintiff who establishes his right to be compensated on
quantum meruit should recover as much as he reasonably deserves for
his services and for the time and labor required for them. There is no
specific test which must be applied to determine the reasonable value
of such services. It is a matter of equity depending upon the circum-
stances of each case." . . . Guided by this expression of quantum
meruit recovery, we determine that the plaintiff was entitled to a
judgment of $1,700.5
The preceding passage amply demonstrates the drawbacks of the quantum meruit
remedy. "Quantum meruit" is a Latin expression meaning "as much as he
deserves." 6 Therefore, the observation made by the Jones court, that a plaintiff
who is entitled to quantum meruit should recover "as much as he reasonably
deserves," is a mere tautology. One who is entitled to quantum meruit recovery
is, by definition, entitled to as much as he deserves. This observation provides
little guidance for determining how much the plaintiff deserves. Recovery may
be "a matter of equity depending upon the circumstances of each case,' 8 7 but
litigants are still entitled to know the rules of recovery before the judgment is
rendered. Attorneys should be able to read the Fullerton opinion and understand
exactly how the court arrived at its $1700 figure. Parties cannot understand the
basis for a decision when the court simply states that it has determined that such
an award is reasonable.
The actio de in rem verso as presented in Article 2298 does not solve all of
the problems of quasi-contractual remedies. It will, however, provide the
members of bench and bar with a universal vocabulary. They can now clearly
83. See, e.g., Daspit v. City of Alexandria, 342 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 344
So. 2d 1056 (1977).
84. Fullerton v. Scarecrow Club, Inc., 440 So. 2d 945 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 950 (quoting Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914, 917 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974)).
86. See supra note 4.
87. Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914, 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
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discuss the pertinent issues, rather than arguing over "reasonableness" and
"equity." Unless supported by a clearly defined standard, reasonableness and
equity are too vague to be of much use in predicting the outcome of litigation
or planning one's affairs. Article 2298, which replaces quantum meruit as a
basis for recovery, provides the necessary standard.
Unfortunately, this codal solution did not arrive until 1996. The first attempt
to revive the actio de in rem verso and to create a consistent set of standards for
its application came from the judiciary." After a delay of over a century, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reintroduced the actio de in rem verso in Minyard v.
Curtis Products, Inc8 9 Curtis Products, the defendant, was the successor to two
corporations: Plastoid Products and Plastic Products. These two companies were
closely related in name and in function. Plastic Products manufactured a faulty
caulking compound and Plastoid Products distributed and sold that compound.
Minyard (who had no direct contractual link to Plastic Products), a subcontractor
at a construction project, purchased the caulking compound from Plastoid
Products.90
In 1953, Minyard applied the faulty caulking compound to a public construc-
tion project. Minyard had guaranteed the quality of the compound to the public
agency, relying on the assertions of the manufacturer, Plastic Products. Because
of this guarantee, Minyard was held liable to the contractor for the damages
suffered by the public agency. 91 Minyard then sought indemnity against Curtis
Products as the successor to the manufacturer of the compound, Plastic Products.
The district court determined that although Minyard's petition was styled
"Petition for Indemnity," it actually stated a cause of action in redhibition or in
breach of contract. 92 The Court of Appeal agreed. Based on this finding, and
the fact that the contract was formed in 1953, both courts found for the
defendant because Minyard's claim had prescribed.93
Minyard's liability to the contractor arose in March 1965. Minyard filed the
indemnity action on November 17, 1965 against Curtis as the successor of Plastic
Products. 94 Minyard did not allege a claim against Curtis as the successor to
Plastoid, the seller and distributor. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that
because Minyard had never entered into a contract with Plastic Products, no
claim based on redhibition or breach of contract was possible." The lower
88. See Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).
89. 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).
90. Id. at 636-37, 205 So. 2d at 427.
91. The court specifically found that Minyard had not been at fault in applying the compound.
Id.
92. Id. at 635, 205 So. 2d at 426.
93. Id.
94. If the suit had been against Curtis as the successor to Plastoid, then the pleas of prescription
for redhibition and breach of contract may have been appropriate. Minyard had no contract with
Plastic Products, so redhibition and breach of contract, with their corresponding prescriptive periods,
were not applicable. Minyard, 251 La. at 636-37, 205 So. 2d at 427.
95. Id. at 637, 205 So. 2d at 427.
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courts had erroneously characterized the action as one sounding in redhibition or
breach of contract. Consequently, the lower courts had erred in finding that
prescription had run96
The supreme court characterized Minyard's claim as an action for indemnity.
Because the Louisiana Civil Code did not provide an explicit prescriptive period
for actions seeking indemnity, the court examined the theoretical basis for
indemnity in order to determine the appropriate prescriptive period." The court
first distinguished indemnity, from contribution.9" The court explained that
contribution was based upon the concept that of several faulty parties, each
should bear a fair share of the responsibility. Indemnity claims involve cases
where only one party is at fault. The other party is blameless, but is held
responsible due to some legal relationship with the party at fault. Here, Minyard
was held liable because it had guaranteed the faulty caulking compound
manufactured by Plastic Products. The court concluded that Minyard was
blameless, but that Louisiana law provided no express statutory remedy." The
court stated that a statutory basis for an action in indemnity could be constructed
from Articles 21 and 1965 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870."° Since this
action was based on the principle forbidding unjust enrichment, it was subject to
the general ten year prescriptive period. Prescription on the action for indemnity
did not begin to accrue until Minyard's liability was determined, which was in
March 1965. Consequently, the prescriptive period had not yet elapsed.'0 '
Although the above analysis would have solved the problem presented by
Minyard, the Louisiana Supreme Court used the opportunity to resurrect the actio
de in rem verso. The court surveyed the jurisprudence and observed that
although prior treatment had been inconsistent, some decisions had used the actio
de in rem verso to resolve quasi-contractual disputes. 2 The court cited
several French sources, 3 and remarked that the Louisiana Civil Code articles
on the quasi-contracts were "copied"'" from the French Civil Code. The court
then adopted the modem French version of the actio de in rem verso."IS The
court granted Minyard recovery against Curtis Products by resorting to the newly
adopted actio de in rem verso.'°6
As presented in Minyard, the actio de in rem verso has five elements."°
To invoke the remedy, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant has been
96. Id.
97. Id. at 636-49, 205 So. 2d at 427-31.
98. Minyard, 251 La. at 640-44, 205 So. 2d at 428-29.
99. Id. at 648-49, 205 So. 2d at 431.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 636, 205 So. 2d at 427.
102. Id. at 637-38, 205 So. 2d at 427.
103. Minyard, 251 La. at 650, 205 So. 2d at 432.
104. Id. at 651, 205 So. 2d at 432.
105. Id. at 653, 205 So. 2d at 433.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 651.52, 205 So. 2d at 432.
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enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has been impoverished, (3) that there is a causal
connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) that the enrich-
ment and impoverishment are without lawful cause, and (5) that there is no other
remedy available to the plaintiff."°8 The court found that all of these require-
ments were satisfied and ruled in favor of Minyard. Significantly, as this
comment will discuss below, the new Article 2298 codifies the five Minyard
elements.
One of the first cases to suggest that the application of quasi-contractual
remedies would continue to be troublesome after Minyard was North Develop-
ment Co., Inc. v. McClure."°e The case involved a dispute between several
corporations and a subcontractor. The subcontractor sought recovery for work
done on a paving project, while the corporations counterclaimed based on breach
of contract. The court found that upon entering into the contract the subcontrac-
tor had made a significant error of fact that vitiated consent."' Therefore, the
contract was relatively null. Since the court found that the subcontractor was
without a contractual remedy, the correct remedy would have been to determine
whether the subcontractor could recover through the actio de in rem verso.
Instead, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal invoked quantum meruit.
No discussion of the actio de in rem verso appeared in the decision. The
subcontractor's proper recovery in quantum meruit was not the amount by which
the corporations had been enriched, or even the amount by which the subcontrac-
tor had been impoverished. The court awarded the subcontractor the cost of its
efforts, increased by a reasonable profit."' Since the contract was void, the
rationale behind this decision is difficult to understand. The court explained its
decision to award expenses incurred and a reasonable profit in the following
passage:
The general rule on the amount of recovery allowed under the doctrine
of quantum meruit is the value of the services or materials which have
inured to the benefit of another. In making a determination of what is
a reasonable value of the services performed, the court must look to the
circumstances involved in each individual case.
108. This last element, that there is no other remedy available to the plaintiff, is known as the
requirement of subsidiarity. It is a practical requirement, designed to prevent the actio de in rem
verso from swallowing up the entire realm of contract and tort law, since it is general enough to be
used in almost any private cause of action. The requirement of subsidiarity presented some analytical
problems for the court in Minyard, which will be discussed later. "The fifth requirement, that there
be no other remedy available at law, is simply an aspect of the principle that the action must not be
allowed to defeat the purpose of a rule of law directed to the matter at issue. It must not, in the
language of some writers, 'perpetrate a fraud on the law.' Article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code
prohibits a reference to principles of equity in cases which would allow application of more specific
legal action." Id. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 432.
109. North Dev. Co. v. McClure, 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 400.
111. Id. at 400-01.
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Our language in the Ward case inferring [sic] that under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment a claimant is only allowed to recover
actual cost is not in accord with the majority of the jurisprudence, and
although it may have been appropriate under the facts of that case, we
do not deem it to apply to the facts of this case. In Swan v. Beaubouef,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal allowed a contractor to recover a
reasonable profit as well as his actual cost of labor and materials in the
application of the doctrine of quantum meruit.
La.C.C. Art. 1965 is the source of the doctrine of quantum meruit
in this State and is intended to afford relief under appropriate circum-
stances in equity when there is no remedy under the general law. We
believe it would be inequitable to relegate the subcontractor in this case
to only actual cost of labor and material. This would in effect allow the
adverse parties to enrich themselves at his expense for the amount of
reasonable profit usually made by the subcontractor in return for his
undertaking." 2
This argument is not persuasive. It ignores the fact that the subcontractor
is partially to blame for the fact that the contract between the parties was
vitiated. The error of fact was his. The result in this case, if taken to its logical
conclusion, suggests that contracts are useless. If a subcontractor can recover
expenses and a reasonable profit without a contract, and even if the purported
contract was abrogated due to his error, why should he bother with negotiations
at all? The recent codification of the principle forbidding unjust enrichment
addresses the problem. The result under the new Article 2298, which limits
recovery to the lesser of the amount of the enrichment and the amount of the
impoverishment, is preferable to the result in the North case.
Another important Louisiana Supreme Court opinion concerning the actio
de in rem verso is Morphy, Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000."'
In that case, the plaintiff sought recovery for services rendered under an alleged
oral contract on a construction project. The trial court and court of appeal held
that the lack of agreement on the amount of compensation vitiated the consent
of the parties and abrogated the contract. While the plaintiff sought $75,000 as
the fair market value of its services, the trial court awarded only $45,000 in
quantum meruit. The court of appeal found the requirements for the actio de in
rem verso were satisfied, and affirmed the $45,000 award." 4 The Louisiana
Supreme Court disagreed, finding a valid oral contract.' The lack of agree-
ment concerning compensation was insufficient to abrogate the contract because
the law assumes that a contracting party will be paid a reasonable sum for his
112. Id. at 400 (italics added) (citations omitted).
113. Morphy, Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569 (La. 1989).
114. Id. at 570-71.
115. Id. at 573.
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services.116 The court expressed its exasperation with the ubiquity of common
law quantum meruit, and distinguished it from the Louisiana version."7 The
court then criticized three cases,'" Custom Builders & Supply, Inc. v. Rev-
els,119 Swiftships, Inc. v. Burdin,12' and Houma Armature Works & Supply
v. Landry,' which had confused the two forms of quantum meruit and had
improperly limited the plaintiffs recovery. In each of these cases, a contract
lacked a term regarding compensation. Thus, the Louisiana version of quantum
meruit should have been utilized to determine a reasonable compensation under
the contract. However, in each case the court of appeal incorrectly used a
variant of the common law quantum meruit or the actio de in rem verso to limit
the plaintiff's recovery to the amount of the enrichment."
The Morphy court concluded that since the contract between the parties was
valid, the actio de in rem verso was inapplicable. 2 1 The plaintiff should
recover a reasonable amount for the services it rendered under the contract."
More than any other case, Morphy clearly established that the Louisiana
Supreme Court prefers the actio de in rem verso to quantum meruit. The recent
revision of Article 2298 reinforces that preference. Henceforth, any Louisiana
court using the expression "quantum meruit" should first determine whether a
contract exists. If not, quantum meruit is inapplicable. If so, the court should
be referring to the Louisiana version of quantum meruit, which is used only to
supply a missing compensation term for an otherwise valid contract.
III. ARTICLE 2298
The long line of cases extending from Minyard to Morphy suggests that the
actio de in rem verso has become firmly rooted in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
116. Id. at 574.
117. The court stated: "Unfortunately for the purity of our civilian concepts, the cases in our
jurisprudence which have applied these codal provisions have often referred to this reasonable value
of services or equitable ascertainment of compensation or price as 'quantum meruit' or an action in
quantum meruit." Id. at 574.
118. Id. at 574-75.
119. 310 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
120. 338 So. 2d 1193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
121. 417 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1st Cit. 1982).
122. Compare the above three cases with North Dev. Co. v. McClure, 276 So. 2d 395 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1973), wherein the court made the opposite mistake. After determining that there was no
binding contract, the North court applied the Louisiana version of quantum meruit, which is only
applicable when there is an existing contract. See supra text accompanying notes 104-109.
123. Murphy, 538 So. 2d at 575.
124. "There is no specific test which must be applied to determine the reasonable value for such
services. It is a matter of equity depending upon the circumstances of each case." Morphy,
Makofsky, & Masson, Inc. v. Canal Place 2000, 538 So. 2d 569, 575 (La. 1989), quoting Jones v.
City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). After noting that ther was
substantial evidence to support the position that Morphy was charging an unusually low rate for its
services, the court awarded Morphy the invoice price. Morphy, 538 So. 2d at 575.
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Even after Morphy, however, courts have used quantum meruit in a wide variety
of situations, particularly in disputes concerning attorney fees."z The Louisi-
ana State Law Institute began work on a revision of the Civil Code Articles
concerning quasi-contracts in 1991. After years of committee meetings and
revisions, the Institute submitted a proposal to the Louisiana Legislature in 1995.
That proposal became 1995 Louisiana Acts 1041. The most important article
revised by 1995 Louisiana Acts 1041 is Article 2298, which codifies the general
principles underlying quasi-contractual remedies.
Art. 2298. Enrichment without cause; compensation
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of
another person is bound to compensate that person. The term "without
125. See, e.g., Pilie & Pilie v. Metz, 547 So. 2d 1305 (La. 1989) (dispute concerning attorney
fees); DeVillier v. DeVillier, 602 So. 2d 1093 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (attorney fees); Hebert v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (attorney fees); Martin Flanagan
Design, Inc. v. R.L. Stem and Sons, Ltd., 540 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (recovery granted
for services rendered which were not covered by agreement); Mitchell v. Turner, 588 So. 2d 1305
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (attorney fees); Brown v. Williams, 587 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991)
(real estate broker sought commission); Harper v. J.B. Wells Estate, 575 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1991) (court used Louisiana version of quantum meruit in completing a contract for car restoration);
Woodard v. Felts, 573 So. 2d 1312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff sought compensation for
forestry services); Miller v. Gaspard, 664 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995) (attorney fees); Drilled
Crossings, Inc. v. Texaco, 663 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995) (recovery for drilling services);
Century 21 Flavin Realty v. Erwin Heirs, Inc., 660 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995) (dispute
concerning real estate commission); Brankline v. Capuano, 656 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995)
(dispute concerning immovable property); Dunn v. Land and Marine Properties, 609 So. 2d 284 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 1252 (1993) (attorney fees); Kibbe v. Lege, 604 So. 2d
1366 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 606 So. 2d 540 (1992) (compensation for services rendered
prior to dispute over immovable property); American Greetings v. Manuel, 602 So. 2d 160 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1992) (employer sought reimbursement from employee under self-insurance policy); Salard
v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 563 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (court stated rule of law that
when contract is not substantially performed, contractor's recovery will be limited to quantum
meruit); Laga v. Village of Loreauville, 571 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (court used
Louisiana version of quantum meruit to compensate pathologist for work done when no price had
been set); Blackie's Rental Tool & Supply v. Vanway, 563 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (tool
company recovered for use of tools in absence of binding contract); Gulf States Util. Co. v.
Delcambre Tel. Co., 546 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (compensation for relocation of utility
poles); Brennan v. Shell Offshore, 635 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (attorney fees); Palmisano
v. Mascero, 611 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 80 (1993) (court used
quantum meruit to grant recovery to general partner of partnership in commendam for services
rendered, despite the fact that a contract with limited partners specifically stated there would be no
compensation for general partner's services); Lawrence v. Wynne, 598 So. 2d 1293 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 969 (1992) (attorney fees); Melendreras v. Blanchard, 598 So. 2d 1226
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (attorney fees); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1004
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (lease of copying machines); Bertucci v. McIntire, 648 So. 2d 956 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1994) (attorney fees); Bar-Tow, Inc. v. Roy's Transp., Inc., 616 So. 2d 203 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1993) (compensation for towing services); Alonzo v. Chifici, 541 So. 2d 303 (LL App. 5th Cir.
1989) (court refused to use the words "quantum meruit," but still used the principles of quantum
meruit to resolve case); Prado v. Golemi, 540 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (real estate).
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cause" is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment
results from a valid juridical act or the law. The remedy declared here is
subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy
for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to which
one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is
less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the
time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time
the judgment is rendered."
A. Enrichment, Impoverishment, and Causal Connection
Article 2298 codifies the actio de in rem verso. The article incorporates the
five elements listed in Minyard: enrichment, impoverishment, a causal connection
between the two, lack of legal cause, and subsidiarity.'27 The first three elements,
although not explicitly listed, are required by the first sentence of the article and the
accompanying comments. 8 Before a plaintiff can recover under this article he
must establish (1) that he has been impoverished, (2) that the defendant has been
enriched, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the two. The first
sentence provides that "A person who has been enriched without cause at the
expense of another person is bound to compensate that person."'2 This sentence
contains each of the first three Minyard elements. First, if the plaintiffcannot prove
he has been impoverished, he cannot prove the defendant has been enriched at the
expense of another person, and hence he cannot recover damages.'o Second, if
126. 1995 La. Acts No. 1041, § 1.
127. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 652-53, 205 So. 2d 422, 433 (La. 1967).
128. Comments (a) and (b) provide as follows:
(a) This provision is new. It expresses the principle of enrichment without cause that
was inherent but not fully expressed in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. The
formulation of the principle accords with civilian doctrine and jurisprudence.
(b) A person is enriched within the meaning of this Article when his patrimonial assets
increase or his liabilities diminish. Correspondingly, a person is impoverished when his
patrimonial assets diminish or his liabilities increase. There must be a causal connection,
whether direct or indirect, between a person's enrichment and another person's
impoverishment.
La. Civ. Code art. 2298. Although the comments to Article 2298, which are written by the article's
principal drafter, explicitly state that the actio de in rem verso has been incorporated, the following
discussion attempts to demonstrate that the first three elements of the actio de in rem verso,
enrichment, impoverishment, and a causal connection, are all required by the first sentence of the
Article. Since comments do not have the force of law, it is generally preferable to determine whether
the text of the article in question can support the suggested interpretation. In the case of Article
2298, the text and the comments harmonize perfectly.
129. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
130. The plaintiff could theoretically attempt to prove that the defendant had been enriched at
the expense of some third party. However, this would create two problems. The first is that the
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the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant has been enriched, then of course
Article 2298 by its own terms is inapplicable. Finally, the phrase "enriched at the
expense of another" establishes the necessity of a causal connection between the
enrichment and the impoverishment. This language clearly contemplates a situation
in which the gain of one party is the cause of the loss to the other party. Below,
each of the first three elements is discussed at length. In the following discussion,
the word "plaintiff' signifies the party alleging entitlement to recovery under
Article 2298, while the word "defendant" signifies the alleged enrichee.
1. Enrichment
Article 2298 rquires that the plaintiff establish that the defendant has been
"enriched without cause.''. To prevail, therefore, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant has been enriched.
Brignac v. Boisdore'32 is a Louisiana Supreme Court decision which
provides an edifying discussion of enrichment. In Brignac, a lessor filed an
action to recover rent due under a lease. The lessee filed a third-party demand
against its sublessee for rent on the same premises. The sublessee reconvened
against the lessee and third-partied the lessor, seeking reimbursement for the
costs of repairing a badly deteriorated floor on the leased premises. The trial
court rendered judgments in favor of all three parties, but the Court of Appeal
reversed the judgment in favor of the sublessee.' The Supreme Court
affirmed. Since the sublessee had not furnished notice of the required repairs,
it could not recover under the lease, which had a notice requirement." The
sublessee could not recover by statute from the owner, since the applicable
statute also had a notice requirement. 3 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
found that the sublessee had not demonstrated that the lessor had been
enriched.'36 Substantial evidence suggested that the floor was not salvageable,
and that the repairs had been futile.'" Quoting at length from Minyard, the
court held that the sublessee could not recover through the actio de in rem verso
because it had failed to prove the lessor's enrichment. 8 Even though the
plaintiff would probably lack standing to bring such a claim before the court. The second is that the
plaintiff would be unable to prove any recoverable damages, since by assumption he has not been
impoverished.
131. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
132. 288 So. 2d 31 (La. 1973).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 34.
135. Id.
136. The court suggested in a footnote that the sublessee had also failed to prove the correct
form of impoverishment, since the loss it incurred was largely the result of its own failure to abide
by the terms of the sublease. The sublease had been drafted by the sublessee's attorneys, so the court
was unwilling to relieve the sublessee from its terms. Id. at 35 n.2.
137. Id. at 36.
138. Id. at 35.
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sublessee had been impoverished by his action in repairing the floor, and even
though he was no longer entitled to use the premises, he would not have
recovered under the new Article 2298. The fact of impoverishment alone is
insufficient. The plaintiff must clearly demonstrate that the defendant has
materially benefited from the act which gave rise to litigation. In Brignac, the
floor remained unusable even after the plaintiffs attempted repairs. Since the
plaintiffs work was of no use to the defendant, there had been no enrichment.
Professor Levasseur identifies three conceivable kinds of enrichment sufficient
to create liability under Article 2298: increase in the economic and monetary value
of the assets owned by the defendant, decrease in the defendant's liabilities, or an
intellectual or moral benefit susceptible of monetary evaluation.'39
By far the most common form of enrichment will be an increase in the
monetary value of the defendant's assets. Professor Levasseur offers the following
examples of increased assets: the defendant's retention of the full price paid for a
defective good; the defendant's acquisition of a large billboard which, although
located so that it caused a net economic loss to the defendant when left in place,
was capable of being removed and sold for a net gain; and the incorporation by a
city of pre-existing facilities into its water and sewerage system.1" Generally,
any situation that increases the value of the defendant's patrimony can be termed
an enrichment for purposes of Article 2298.
The second form of enrichment is a decrease in the defendant's liabilities. The
most common factual situation that would create this form of enrichment is one in
which the plaintiff pays a debt owed by the defendant. Since this situation is
covered by the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing payment of a thing not due,
which are beyond the scope of this comment, no further discussion of this form of
enrichment will be undertaken here.' 4'
The third possible form of enrichment is an intellectual or moral benefit
susceptible ofpecuniary evaluation. Although contractual recovery for nonpecuni-
ary loss is recognized in the Louisiana Civil Code, 42 extension of the concept of
nonpecuniary damages and nonpecuniary benefits into the realm of quasi-
contractual obligations seems troublesome. When a plaintiff can prove no
contractual basis for recovery, and can prove no enrichment to the defendant other
than an intellectual or moral benefit, a court should be faced with compelling
circumstances before granting the plaintiff monetary damages under Article 2298.
2. Impoverishment
The plaintiff must prove not only enrichment, but enrichment "at the expense
of another person."'43 The defendant, if liable, will be "bound to compensate
139. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 371.
140. Id. at 372.
141. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2299-2305.
142. La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
143. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
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that person, '"1 meaning the person at whose expense the enrichment occurred.
Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that he is that person at whose expense the
enrichment ocurred and that he has been impoverished as a result of that enrich-
ment.
A compensable impoverishment may take the form of a decrease in the
plaintiff's patrimonial assets, an increase in the plaintiff's liabilities, or a missed
opportunity to increase the plaintiffs patrimonial assets.' 45 Minyard v. Curtis
Products provides two examples of impoverishment. The subcontractor,
Minyard, paid for a faulty caulking compound. Since the caulking compound
eventually proved unusable, Minyard suffered a net decrease in its patrimonial
assets. Minyard paid more for the compound than it was worth.'" In addition
to the loss in patrimonial assets, Minyard suffered an increase in its liabilities
when it was held liable for the damage caused by the caulking compound. This
second impoverishment formed the basis for Minyard's eventual recovery from
Curtis Products. 4
7
The third type of impoverishment, a missed opportunity to increase the
plaintiff's patrimonial assets, might occur when a plaintiff with limited resources
has the opportunity to form a contract to render services for either Party A, or
Party B, but not for both. Plaintiff chooses to pursue contract negotiations with
Party A, and declines Party B's offer. If Party A then rejects the plaintiffs
services without cause, the plaintiff has been unjustly impoverished because he
has missed the opportunity to derive a profit from Party B. Of course, the
plaintiffs recovery is contingent upon his ability to prove Party A's enrichment,
and that will be difficult. The purpose of this illustration is to demonstrate the
third type of compensable impoverishment.
Not all impoverishments will entitle a plaintiff to recovery under Article
2298. For example, in Charrier v. Bell,'" an amateur archaeologist unearthed
and removed over two tons of Indian artifacts from a burial site on the Trudeau
Plantation. The Tunica Indians contested ownership of the artifacts, and
eventually prevailed. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Tunica
Indians had been unjustly enriched by his efforts. His impoverishment consisted
of the lost time and labor he had expended in unearthing the artifacts. The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied his claims on other grounds. The
court noted that, although it did not specifically address the issue, it doubted that
144. Id.
145. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 378.
146. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422, 427 (La. 1967). While
Minyard may have suffered an impoverishment in purchasing the caulking compound, it could not
have recovered for that impoverishment under Article 2298. Recovery of the price paid for defective
goods is governed by the Louisiana Civil Code articles on redhibition. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2520-
2548. Minyard's claim in redhibition against Plastoid Products had prescribed, and Article 2298,
which is a purely subsidiary remedy, cannot be used to circumvent prescription. La. Civ. Code art.
2298.
147. Minyard, 251 La. at 624, 205 So. 2d at 433.
148. Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 753 (1986).
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the plaintiff's impoverishment could support recovery, because he had continued
excavation long after he learned that he was trespassing on private property.
149
The court suggested that the plaintiff's impoverishment, if any, resulted directly
from his delictual conduct.' 50 Such an impoverishment is not compensable
under Article 2298.
3. Causal Connection
The third of the "factual elements" of Article 2298 is the existence of a
causal connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment. This element
is derived from the language "enriched without cause at the expense of
another.'' The clear meaning of the words is that one party, the defendant,
has been enriched while another party, the plaintiff, has borne the expense of that
enrichment. Since Article 2298 requires that the plaintiff must be impoverished
by the same set of factual circumstances that caused the defendant's enrichment,
there is a need for a causal connection between the two.
On the subject of causation, one commentator has written:
An action de in rem verso can be granted only in those instances where
it can be established that the impoverishment of one party and the
enrichment of the other are the unquestionable result, or the cause and
effect, of the same event. The enrichment must be so obviously
connected to the impoverishment that, without the latter, it would not
have occurred.'
The various circumstances that satisfy the requirement of a causal connection
in Article 2298 fit into two possible categories of causal connections: direct
connections and indirect connections. Direct connections are those that involve
no third party: the enrichee and the impoverishee interact directly. In Beacham
v. Hardy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the advertising company erected an
immovable sign on Mr. Beacham's property. The court found there was no
contract between the parties, and by law Mr. Beacham became the owner of the
sign. 54  The connection between the enrichment and impoverishment is
obvious. Mr. Beacham was enriched by the value of the same sign that the
advertising company lost. Both the enrichment and the impoverishment derived
from the placing of the sign on Mr. Beacham's property without his permis-
sion.'55 A more direct example of cause and effect is hard to imagine.
149. Charrier, 496 So. 2d at 606-07.
150. Id. at 606.
151. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
152. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 382.
153. 520 So. 2d 1086 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 1088.
155. Id.
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Indirect causal connections are, as one might expect, less obvious. One
example of an indirect causal connection can be found in Minyard v. Curtis
Products.5 6 Minyard, the subcontractor, was found liable for the damages
caused by the caulking compound it used in the construction project. The direct
cause of Minyard's liability was the fact that it had guaranteed the quality of the
compound. This fact would not entitle Minyard to recover from Curtis Products.
Minyard had never conducted business with Curtis Products. Minyard had
purchased the caulking compound from Plastoid Products. Plastoid Products had
acquired the compound from Plastic Products. Plastic Products manufactured the
compound that led to the damages Minyard ultimately suffered. Since Plastic
Products would have been liable for the damages Minyard had to pay, Plastic
Products was clearly, although indirectly, enriched by the same transaction that
caused Minyard's impoverishment: the sale of the compound from Plastoid
Products to Minyard. The connection becomes still more attenuated when one
recalls that at the time of Minyard's indemnity action, Plastic Products no longer
existed. Curtis Products was the defendant, as the successor company to Plastic
Products. Curtis Products was unjustly enriched because it gained all of the
patrimonial assets of Plastic Products, which included those assets unjustly
gained at the expense of Minyard.'" Thus, the causal connection in Minyard
runs from the lawsuit filed against Minyard to the guarantee issued by Minyard,
then to the sale from Plastoid Products to Minyard, then from Plastoid Products
to the manufacturer, Plastic Products, and finally from Plastic Products to its
successor company, Curtis Products. Minyard provides a good example of an
indirect causal connection.
B. "Without Cause"
The fourth element of the actio de in rem verso, the lack of a lawful cause,
is explicitly stated in the text of Article 2298. The fourth element is additionally
clarified by a definition. The second sentence provides: "The term 'without
cause' is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment results
from a valid juridical act or the law."'5 This terminology should suffice to
codify the existing jurisprudence as represented by Edmonston v. A-Second
Mortgage Co. ' 59
Edmonston involved a parcel of immovable property and a series of
mortgages. The plaintiff and her husband had executed a first mortgage on the
family home, and also incurred certain personal obligations which the lender set
as preconditions of its loan. The plaintiff later arranged a second mortgage.
Financial trouble ensued, and the plaintiff transferred ownership of the home to
156. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (La. 1967).
157. Id. at 427-33.
158. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
159. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co. of Slidell, Inc., 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
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the defendant, holder of the second mortgage, through a dation en paiement.'"
In exchange, the defendant canceled the second mortgage and assumed
responsibility for the first mortgage. Upon the death of the plaintiffs husband,
the holder of the original mortgage sought payment of the full amount due under
the mortgage note, pursuant to its contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid
the amount due. She then brought an action against the defendant, seeking
reimbursement for the amount she had paid, and alleging violation of the terms
of the dation en paiement." After the trial court and court of appeal found
for the defendant, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover through the actio de in rem verso."6  The
court's discussion of the various elements of the actio de in rem verso was much
more comprehensive than in the previous cases. The fourth element, which
requires the absence of a lawful cause for the enrichment or impoverishment,
was clarified. The court adopted the prevalent French position, defining "cause"
differently than in general contract law. In contract law, cause is defined as "the
reason why a party obligates himself."63 For the purposes of the fourth
element of the actio de in rem verso, "cause" means a lawful and binding
juridical act between the enrichee and the impoverishee or the enrichee and a
third party.'" 4
Article 2298 also encompasses the definition of cause found in the next
significant Louisiana Supreme Court decision to apply the actio de in rem verso,
Creely v. Leisure Living, Inc.65 A real estate broker contracted to sell a house,
but after some time the builder/owner, no longer satisfied with the broker's
efforts, elected to sell it directly. The trial court found that the broker was
entitled to $1,500 in quantum meruit for services rendered, and the builder
appealed. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed.'" The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding that the broker
was not entitled to the commission as a third-party beneficiary to the subsequent
purchase agreement between the builder and the purchaser. 67 In Edmonston,
the court had stated that for purposes of the actio de in rem verso, "cause" meant
a valid juridical act between the enrichee and the impoverishee, or between the
enrichee and a third party. 6 ' After a brief inspection of the other elements,
the Creely court found that the fourth element of the actio de in rem verso,
which requires absence of a lawful cause, was not satisfied because there was a
160. Dation en paiement is a French expression meaning "giving in payment." See La. Civ.
Code arts. 2655-2659.
161. Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 119.
162. Id. at 123.
163. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
164. Edmonston, 289 So. 2d at 122.
165. Creely v. Leisure Living, Inc., 437 So. 2d 816 (La. 1983).
166. Creely v. Leisure Living, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
167. Creely, 437 So. 2d at 823.
168. Id. at 822.
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lawful cause for the enrichment and accompanying impoverishment." The
court found this cause to be "[the seller's] investment of skill, time, labor and
financing and his good fortune in his finding a buyer."'7 ° Although the court's
list may not seem to be composed of juridical acts, each of the listed items can
be said to have contributed to the seller's ability to sell the property. A sale of
immovable property is clearly a juridical act, and to the extent that the listed
items are components of the sale, they are also juridical acts. A more direct
juridical act was the seller's refusal to renew his agreement with the broker.
Either choice would be sufficient to lead the court to the correct result: Article
2298 and the actio de in rem verso are inapplicable here.
C. Subsidiarity
The final element of the actio de in rem verso, subsidiarity, also explicitly
appears in the text of Article 2298. The final sentence of the first paragraph
provides: "The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if
the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary
rule.''
Article 2298 remains a purely subsidiary remedy. The last portion of the
last sentence characterizes the nature of the subsidiarity, and should correct a
jurisprudential error that entered the jurisprudence with Minyard v. Curtis
Products.72  The article makes clear that the actio de in rem verso is not
available if any other remedy is available at law, or if a contrary rule has been
established. Language in Minyard suggested that the word "subsidiary" indicated
that the remedy should not be used if it would "perpetrate a fraud on the
law."'7 The Minyard language is correct, but insufficiently comprehensive.
It is true that the actio de in rem verso should never be used to allow recovery
to a plaintiff whose recovery would be barred by positive law. However, the
language used by the court in Minyard and Edmonston suggests that in a
situation in which the plaintiff could recover under either the actio de in rem
verso or under positive law, the rule of subsidiarity no longer applies, and the
court should be free to use either remedy. For example, the language of
Minyard suggests that a plaintiff who has paid a thing not owed would be able
to prevail on an action under Article 2298, or alternatively on an action for the
payment of a thing not owed. Since the plaintiff could satisfy the requirements
of either cause of action, and since both theories of recovery favor the plaintiff,
there would be no "fraud on the law." Minyard suggests that if the plaintiff can
recover under either theory, the choice is irrelevant. The suggestion is incorrect.
A plaintiff who has a cause of action under the Louisiana Civil Code articles
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
172. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 653, 205 So. 2d 422, 433 (La. 1967).
173. Id. at 652, 205 So. 2d at 433.
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concerning payment of a thing not owed cannot bring an action under Article
2298. The danger in the interpretation suggested by Minyard is twofold. First,
it substitutes a general remedy for a specific one. It encourages courts to use the
actio de in rem verso in a variety of situations in which the Louisiana Legislature
has provided precise statutory guidance. As the Minyard court recognized,
unbridled judicial discretion is an enemy of the law.'74 Second, the actio de
in rem verso limits recovery to the lesser of the enrichment or the impoverish-
ment. This limited recovery may work a hardship on a plaintiff, even if he is
entitled to recover under this theory and under positive law.
The following example demonstrates the point. Suppose a landowner, 0,
desires to build a commercial center in an undeveloped area of southwestern
Louisiana. He anticipates that the area will soon experience rapid growth, and
he wants to be the first on the scene. He negotiates a contract with C, a local
contractor, who agrees to build the project in return for one million dollars, to
be paid in five installments. The project is plagued with supply problems, and
C soon realizes he will be lucky to make a profit. Shortly before the final
payment is due, and after the project is substantially complete, 0 announces that
he will not honor the contract. C immediately files suit, and the court finds the
following: 0 is in breach of contract, and 0 has been unjustly enriched. If the
Minyard interpretation of the element of subsidiarity is used, then C is entitled
to recover under either theory. However, the amount of recovery may differ
substantially. Even if the court were to employ the actio de in rem verso, the
result would not contradict positive law, because C will recover in either case.
The language of Minyard permits the court to choose which remedy it will
employ. The court chooses to employ the actio de in rem verso. Testimony
establishes that C has spent $950,000 on this project, and has been paid $800,000
of the one million dollar contract price. Thus, C has been impoverished by
$150,000. Experts demonstrate that the vacant land had a market value of
$20,000. The improved land has a market value of only $830,000, due to the
demographic projections which show that the area's population will never be
large enough to make this venture profitable. 0 has paid $800,000 and the
market value of his property has grown by $810,000. Thus, he has been unjustly
enriched by $10,000. The court takes the lesser of the enrichment and the
impoverishment, and awards C $10,000. Thus C has lost $140,000 on the
project, while 0 has lost nothing.
This example illustrates the danger of using the actio de in rem verso when
other, more specific legal remedies are available. C should have recovered the
full amount remaining unpaid on the contract, and 0 should have borne the loss
resulting from his lack of foresight. Article 2298 establishes the true subsidiary
nature of this action. The article makes clear that the actio de in rem verso is
174. Id. at 650, 205 So. 2d at 432 (citing Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law,
Part I, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 605 (1962)).
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available only when no other legal rule or remedy exists, regardless of whether
the rule or remedy favors the enrichee or the impoverishee.
The Louisiana Legislature considered whether to maintain subsidiarity as an
element of Article 2298. In fact, the original version of the bill eliminated all
reference to subsidiarity, and the original comments to Article 2298 explicitly
stated that the remedy was no longer subsidiary.' A reasoned consideration
of the ramifications of removing the requirement of subsidiarity from such a
generally applicable provision, however, led the Legislature to retain that element
in Article 2298.
D. The Proper Measure of Compensation
The proper measure of compensation, as illustrated by the second paragraph
of Article 2298, is the lesser of the enrichment or the impoverishment. 76
Principles of equity help reach this double limitation on recovery, or the "double
ceiling rule," as it is commonly called.'7 If the enrichee must return more
than he actually received, he would suffer an impoverishment. To remedy an
unjust enrichment by creating an unjust impoverishment would hardly serve to
implement the policies underlying Article 2298. Similarly, if the impoverishee
recovered more than his actual loss he would unjustly benefit at the expense of
another, namely the former enrichee. Article 2298 resolves this potential
difficulty by properly limiting recovery to the lesser of the enrichment and the
impoverishment.
To properly understand this rule, one must recognize that the amount of
enrichment is often not equivalent to the amount of the corresponding impover-
ishment. The well-known confrontation between the strip miner and the farmer
is a useful illustration. 78  A strip miner contracted with a farmer to remove
175. The debate concerning whether Article 2298 should be a subsidiary remedy was a lengthy one.
It began as early as September 1992, when the reporter to the Louisiana State Law Institute's Quasi-
Contract Committee "argued that the action for unjustified enrichment should not be subsidiary and
should not be only available if there were no other legal remedy." This idea was opposed by several
committee members. Memorandum from James J. Carter, Jr. to the Quasi-Contracts Committee and Mr.
Stan Raborn 4 (Sept. 28, 1992) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute) (emphasis in original).
In April 1993, "several Council members insisted that this article (2298] should be drafted so that this
remedy or cause of action would not be available or relied upon if another source of law was
applicable." Minutes of Louisiana State Law Institute Meeting of the Council 7 (April 23-24, 1993) (on
file with the Louisiana State Law Institute). The reporter won the original battle, and House Bill 713
as originally written included the following statement: "Under Article 2298, however, recovery for
'enrichment without cause' is no longer a subsidiary remedy." Telefacsimile trmsmission from Jim
Carter to Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos containing draft of proposed Act to amend and reenact Civil
Code Article 2292, at 4 (Feb. 20, 1995) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute). Of course,
Article 2298 as enacted is a subsidiary remedy. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
176. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
177. Levasseur, supra note 6, at 430.
178. This illustration is based upon Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P. 2d 109
(Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906, 84 S. Ct. 195 (1963).
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certain minerals from the farmer's property, in return for valuable consideration.
The farmer demanded and received contractual assurance that the strip miner
would, when mining operations had ceased, return the land to its original
configuration. When the time to fill in the land arrived, the miner refused to
comply with the terms of the contract. The fanner sought damages of $25,000.
The trial court awarded $5000, and both parties appealed. Testimony established
that the cost of filling in the mine was $29,000, while the difference in the
appraised value of the land was only $300.79 Although the court analyzed the
case in terms of contract rights, the situation may usefully illustrate the operation
of Article 2298. The defendant's breach of contract has enriched it by $29,000.
The plaintiff has been impoverished by only $300. Clearly the enrichment and
impoverishment are causally connected, since they both derive from the
defendant's breach of contract. The enrichment is without a lawful cause,
because there is no lawful juridical act between the parties which would justify
the defendant's breach. For purposes of discussion, assume that the fifth
element, subsidiarity, is satisfied. Should the court award the plaintiff any
amount greater than $300, the plaintiff would be unjustly enriched in turn,
because he would receive more money than was necessary to compensate him
for his loss. Therefore, the proper result in this case under Article 2298 would
be to find for the plaintiff in the amount of $300, the lesser of the enrichment
and the impoverishment.
Some Louisiana courts have limited their inquiry to an evaluation of only
one of the ceilings. For example, in Minyard, the Supreme Court granted to the
impoverishee the amount of his impoverishment without ever focusing on the
amount of the defendant's enrichment."s  The court did not attempt to
determine Curtis' actual enrichment, possibly because the Court was thinking of
a petition for indemnity rather than an actio de in rem verso. The court could
have resolved Minyard without reference to the actio de in rem verso, since it
had held that a petition for indemnity was subject to a ten year prescription
claim. Since the court chose to use the opportunity to introduce the actio de in
rem verso as understood in France into Louisiana's jurisprudence, one is left to
wonder why the court did not also explicitly adopt the French limitation on
recovery. If the court determined that the "double ceiling rule" was inappropri-
ate for Louisiana, there is nothing in the opinion to reflect this finding.
Regardless, Article 2298 clearly establishes that the "double ceiling rule" is now
the law in this state.
Compare the result in Minyard with that of Boxwell v. Department of
Highways,' where the Supreme Court stated:
Under these circumstances it would clearly be unjust to permit the
Commission to reap the mentioned benefits and escape liability for them
179. Peevyhouse, 382 P. 2d at 112.
180. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 251 La. 624, 652, 205 So. 2d 422, 433 (La. 1967).
181. BoxweU v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So. 2d 627 (La. 1943).
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altogether. There is imbedded deeply in our civil law the maxim that no
one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another. Revised Civil
Code Article 1965. On the other hand, considering the law's expressed
prohibition for making the sales in the manner shown it would also be
improper for the vendor to profit by the transactions. Equity would
favor, we think, the placing of the parties in the positions that they
occupied prior to the carrying out of their engagements, or in other
words in status quo: but, of course, this is impossible because of the
materials having been used. The only alternative is to compel payment
by the vendee, or its successor, of an amount that represents the
materials' actual cost to the vendor, without allowing any profits on or
expenses connected with the sales."u
The result in Boxwell seems to be in accordance with the rule of recovery
established in Article 2298.
E. The Time of Valuation
The third and final paragraph of Article 2298 provides: "The extent of the
enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the time the suit is brought or,
according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered."''
Generally, impoverishment is much easier to evaluate that the enrichment.
In most situations, the impoverishee will be able to clearly establish his loss.
The value of the enrichment, on the other hand, is likely to generate some
debate. A contractor can demonstrate to a high degree of certainty the amount
of materials and labor expended on a construction project. Once he has ceased
his operations, the amount of impoverishment is set. The corresponding
enrichment is still subject to change. Assuming that the court measures the
enrichment in terms of the increase in appraised land values, the enrichment
could fluctuate from month to month, depending upon circumstances such as
development of nearby land, zoning changes, and other events not necessarily
related to the contractor's efforts.
The third paragraph of Article 2298 attempts to provide the courts with some
general guidance for making these difficult evaluations, while leaving enough
flexibility to allow for the differing factual circumstances of each case. The
preferred rule is to determine the value of the impoverishment and the
enrichment at the time the action is filed. However, if the circumstances dictate
that such an evaluation is impracticable, or that subsequent developments would
render such an evaluation inequitable, the court may choose to evaluate the
enrichment and impoverishment at the time the judgment is rendered.
182. Id. at 773, 14 So. 2d at 632.
183. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.
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The language of the third paragraph clearly indicates that both evaluations
should be made at the same time.' A court should not determine the amount
of the impoverishment as of the date of the petition's filing, while simultaneously
evaluating the enrichment as of the date of the judgment. Since the impoverish-
ment is not likely to change, the practical implications of this observation are not
likely to arise frequently.
IV. CONCLUSION
Quantum meruit has been a fixture in Louisiana jurisprudence for 175 years.
Although it was undoubtedly a necessary importation from the common law in
1820, it is no longer necessary. Article 2298 is as broad, as flexible, and as
utilitarian a basis for recovery as quantum meruit. Article 2298 brings the
additional benefit of a specific analytical framework. Practitioners will no longer
be forced to talk about equity and fairness, concepts that look good on paper but
are impossible to prove in a courtroom. Instead, recovery will be determined by
focusing on the amount of the defendant's enrichment, the amount of the
plaintiffs impoverishment, and a causal connection between the two. If there
is no juridical act to justify the enrichment, and if the plaintiff has no other
recourse, he can recover under Article 2298. Quantum meruit should no longer
be used as a basis for recovery in Louisiana. Its time has passed.
Jeffrey L. Oakes
184. Id.
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